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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Miguel Almanzar Familia (Almanzar) appeals the judgment of sentence imposed 
by the District Court following his plea of guilty pursuant to a plea agreement.  His 
2 
 
counsel has moved to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 
and Almanzar declined to submit a pro se brief in response thereto.  We will grant 
counsel’s motion and affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
When counsel files a motion pursuant to Anders, we determine whether: (1) 
counsel adequately fulfilled the Anders requirements, and (2) an independent review of 
the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.  United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 780 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
 To meet the first prong, appointed counsel must examine the record, conclude that 
there are no nonfrivolous issues for review, and request permission to withdraw.  United 
States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).  Counsel must accompany a motion to 
withdraw with a “brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the 
appeal.”  Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.  Counsel need not raise and reject every possible claim, 
but must, at a minimum, meet the “conscientious examination” standard set forth in 
Anders.  Youla, 241 F.3d at 300. 
 Almanzar’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw along with an Anders brief in 
which he asserts there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal because the District Court 
had jurisdiction, the guilty plea was valid, and the sentence was reasonable. 
 The District Court’s jurisdiction is beyond question.  Almanzar was charged with  
one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms 
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or more of cocaine, contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(ii), in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846.  Because district courts have subject matter jurisdiction over all offenses 
against the laws of the United States under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, there is no viable issue as to 
the District Court’s jurisdiction in this case. 
 The validity of a guilty plea turns on whether the plea was “knowing, voluntary 
and intelligent.”  United States v. Tidwell, 521 F.3d 236, 251 (3d Cir. 2008).  A defendant 
challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea must establish that the trial court failed to 
comply with the mandates of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), and Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 11(b).  See United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202-03 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  The District Court and the Government informed Almanzar through his 
translator of the charges against him, the rights he would be waiving by entering a guilty 
plea, and the ramifications of pleading guilty to the offense, including the nature of the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Almanzar was also asked a number of questions to establish his 
competency and fitness to plead guilty—including whether he was satisfied with and had 
been able to communicate with his court-appointed counsel—which he answered in the 
affirmative through his translator.  Almanzar agreed that he had committed the acts 
outlined in the indictment and that his plea was voluntary.  Accordingly, we find no 
appealable issue of merit as to the validity or voluntariness of Almanzar’s guilty plea. 
 Finally, the reasonableness of Almanzar’s sentence is also beyond dispute.  We 
review a criminal sentence for reasonableness, evaluating both its procedural and 
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substantive underpinnings under a deferential abuse of discretion standard.  Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007).  In imposing a sentence, the District Court must: 
(1) correctly determine, as a matter of fact and as a matter of law, the proper Guidelines 
range; (2) correctly determine the applicability of any departure motions; and (3) exercise 
its discretion to determine the applicability of any of the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 
factors.  See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 The Guidelines imprisonment range of 87-108 months calculated by the Probation 
Office was disputed by Almanzar’s counsel, who argued for a minor role adjustment 
pursuant to USSG § 3B1.2.  Specifically, Almanzar sought a sentence comparable to that 
of one of his co-conspirators, who had accompanied Almanzar during the drug deal in 
question and who received the benefit of USSG § 3B1.2.  But the District Court found 
that Almanzar’s role was more significant than his co-conspirator’s, because Almanzar 
was the essential contact between the seller and the true buyer, known only as “El Viejo,” 
who entrusted the negotiations to Almanzar and supplied him the money to purchase the 
cocaine.  Given Almanzar’s conduct, his connection to El Viejo, and the differences 
between his role in the conspiracy and that of his co-conspirator, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying his request to apply the minor role adjustment.  Thus, 
the District Court properly followed the first step of Gunter. 
 No departures were requested, so the District Court could not have violated the 
second step.  The third step required the Court to make an individualized assessment and 
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consider all of the § 3553(a) factors in determining the final sentence.  In imposing the 
87–month sentence, the District Court reviewed the § 3553(a) factors extensively, clearly 
indicated its consideration of those factors, and imposed its sentence in light of those 
factors.  In explaining its judgment, the District Court explicitly noted that: (1) 
Almanzar’s health and immigration status were not so unusual as to warrant a variance; 
(2) there was no unwarranted sentencing disparity between his conviction and that of 
others convicted of the same crime, including his co-conspirator; (3) the offense of which 
he was convicted was very serious, with a mandatory minimum of 10 years; (4) Almanzar 
was a loyal family man with a good working history; and (5) he was suffering some 
economic pressures when he committed the offense, but they were not unusually great.  
The District Court then imposed a sentence of 87 months imprisonment, which was 33 
months below the statutory minimum and at the bottom of the Guidelines range, because 
Almanzar qualified for the safety valve provision at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5).  
Accordingly, we find no appealable issue of merit as to Almanzar’s sentence. 
 Having exhausted the possible avenues for meritorious appeal, we find that 
counsel’s discussion of the reasons why no appealable issues exist meets the requirements 
of the first prong of Anders. 
II. 
As for the second prong of Anders, we have independently reviewed the record 
and we agree with counsel’s comprehensive analysis as to why no appealable issue exists. 
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 The District Court’s analysis of Almanzar’s prior crimes, his circumstances, and the 
goals of sentencing was more than adequate. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court and, in a separate 
order, grant counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders. 
